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Patricia S. Fernfindez*
It is a biological fact that grandparents are bound to their grandchil-
dren by the unbreakable links of heredity. It is common human expe-
rience that the concern and interest grandparents take in the welfare
of their grandchildren far exceeds anything explicable in purely bio-
logical terms. A very special relationship often arises and continues
between grandparents and grandchildren. The tensions and conflicts
which commonly mar relations between parents and children are often
absent between those very same parents and their grandchildren. Vis-
its with a grandparent are often a precious part of a child's experience
and there are benefits which devolve upon the grandchild from the
relationship with his grandparents which he cannot derive from any
other relationship. '
As the court opinion quoted above recognizes, for many children,
the relationships that develop with their grandparents are happy
ones; visitation means special treats, doting attention, and much af-
fection without the day-to-day conflicts that often arise in the par-
ent-child context. Some children, however, will miss out on this
bonding process, or have it prematurely terminated, due to irrecon-
cilable differences between their parents and grandparents.
Research supports the intuitive assumption that children who are
deprived of this bonding process lose something valuable. Social
scientists have identified at least four "symbolic" roles that help ex-
plain the ways in which grandparents influence their families.2 The
"being there" role requires nothing more than a grandparent's
presence and may help younger generation members in two ways.
First, this presence "mitigates against the obtrusive events of the
outside world and disruptive events of role transitions. . . .[and]
serves to maintain the identity of the family." 3 In times of transi-
* Patricia S. Fernindez is an attorney with the law firm of Brown, Rudnick, Freed &
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of Yale Law School and Wellesley College.
1. Mimkon v. Ford, 332 A.2d 199, 204 (N.J. 1975).
2. Bengtson, Diversity and Symbols in Grandparental Roles, in Grandparenthood 21
(V. Bengston &J. Robertson eds. 1985).
3. Id.
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tion, such as after the birth of a sibling or during divorce, a grand-
parent's presence may exert a calming influence on grand-
children. Second, just by being there, grandparents provide an im-
portant stabilizing influence particularly important for children
born of early teenage mothers.4
The second symbolic role played by grandparents is that of "fam-
ily watchdog." 5 In this role, the grandparent is alert for signs of
abuse or neglect that might indicate that the family will need active
care and protection. Third, an "arbitrating" role may be assumed
when grandparents actively negotiate between parents and children
concerning values and behaviors that may be more central, in the
long run, to family continuity and individual enhancement than
those that the parents' authority status allow to be expressed. 6 Such
negotiation may also occur when grandparents downplay volatile or
disruptive differences between parents and children. The fourth im-
portant symbolic role for grandparents is as "interpreters" of the
family's history. Grandparents may help grandchildren build con-
nections between the family's past, present, and future, which help
children form a firmer sense of identity. 7
Beyond these symbolic roles, grandparents can serve a much dif-
ferent function in families that are unstable due to abuse or neglect.
In these cases, grandparents may be able to provide stability for the
children by monitoring the situation. Such monitoring, depending
on the severity of the problem, may be in lieu of, or in addition to,
state supervision. Children in these situations may be better able to
cope with a less-than-ideal family environment when grandparents
provide them with unconditional affection, support, and attention.8
Grandparents may also be of assistance to children who have been
deemed by the state "delinquent" or "in need of supervision."
4. Id. at 22
5. 1(.
6. Id. at 23.
7. Id. at 24.
8. Some evidence, however, suggests that parents who abuse their children have
been abused themselves. See generally Cerkovnik, The Sexual Abuse of Children: Myths.
Research, and Policy Implications, 89 Dick. L. Rev. 691 (1985). If grandparents are
shown to have been abusers, it is inappropriate to expect them to monitor the abusive
behavior of their own children. One statute specifically denies visitation to grandparents
who have a previous history of abusive conduct. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (Supp.
1987).
9. At least one state has seen fit to grant grandparents standing to petition for visita-
tion in this context. See rex. Fam. Code Ann. § 14.03(e)(4) (Vernon 1986).
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Grandparent Access
Recognizing that grandparent access"' may have a beneficial influ-
ence on children, legislatures in all 50 states have enacted statutes
providing grandparents with legal recourse if they are denied access
to their grandchildren. I" This development reverses the common
law doctrine that usually barred such intrusion into the nuclear fam-
ily. Unfortunately, virtually all of these statutes are poorly drafted
and raise more questions than they answer. The goals of these stat-
;utes are unclear, and the standards for decision-making are gener-
ally too vague to be of help to a judge facing an actual controversy.
The model statute proposed in this Article relies on the assunp-
ton that nuclear family autonomy is so important that state inter-
vention in defense of grandparent access is warranted only when
such access will maintain a relationship that is important and benefi-
cial to the child. Accordingly, the proposed model statute uses a
two-part test to determine when access is warranted. First, a "sub-
10. I use the word "access" to convey a sense of broad contact with the child, includ-
ing phone calls and letters. In this Article, "visitation" is used synonymously with
.access.
II. Ala. Code § 30-3-4 (Supp. 1986); Alaska Stat. § 25.24.150 (1987); Ariz. Rex.
Stat. Ann. § 25-337.01 (Supp. 1987); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1211.2 (Supp. 1985); Cal.
Civ. Code § 197.5 (West 1982); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-1-116 (Supp. 1986); Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 46b-59 (1985); Del. Code AMn. tit. 10, § 950(7) (Supp. 1986); Fla. Stat.
§ 61.13(2)(c) (1984); Ga. Code Ann. § 19-7-3 (Supp. 1982); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 571-
46(7) (1976); Idaho Code § 32-1008 (1983); Il. Ann. Stat. ch. 40, para. 607(b), ch. 110
1/2, para. 11-7.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); Ind. Code Ann. § 31-I-11.7-2 (Burns
1987); Iowa Code Ann. § 598.35 (West 1981); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-129 (1986); K,.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 405.021 (Baldwin 1986); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:572 (West Supp.
1987); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 752(6) (Supp. 1987); Md. Fam. Law Code Ann. § 9-
102 (1984); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 119, § 39D (West Supp. 1987); Mich. C(omp.
Laws Ann. § 722.27(b) (West Supp. 1987); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 257.022 (West 1982):
Miss. Code Ann. § 93-16 (Supp. 1986); Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 452-400(3), 452.402 (Vernon
1986): Mont. Code Ann. § 40-9-102 (1983); Neb. Legislative Bill 105 (Apr. 10, 1986);
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 123.123 (1986); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann § 458.17 (Supp. 1987); N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 9:2-7.1 (West 1976); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-9 (1986); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 72
(Consol. Supp. 1986); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 50-13.2(b) (1984); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-09-
05.1 (Supp. 1987); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3109.05 (Baldwin Supp. 1986); Okla. Stat.
Ann. tit. 10, § 5 (West 1987); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 109.121, 109.123 (1985); Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit.:23, §§ 5301-5313 (Purdon Supp. 1987); R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-24.2 (Sttpp. 1986);
S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-420 (Law. Co-op 1985); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 25-4-53
(1984); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-301 (1984); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 14.03(d) (Vernon
1986). Utah Code Ann. § 30-5-2 (1984); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15. §§ 1011-1016 (Supp.
1987); Va. Code Ann. § 20-107.2 (Supp. 1987); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.09.240
(1986); W. Va. Code §§ 48-2-15(b)(1). 48-2B-1 (1986); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.245(4)
(West 1981); Wvo. Stat. § 20-2-113(c) (1987).
The federal government also has seen fit to address the problem. The House Select
Committee on Aging and the Senate Subcommittee on Separation of Powers have re-
cently recommended that the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Law consider drafting a uniform law on grandparent access. See Grandparents: The
Other Victims of Divorce and Custody Disputes, 1983: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Human Services of the House Select Comm. on Aging, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982):
S. Con. Res. 40, 98th Cong.. Ist Sess. (1983).
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stantial" relationship with the grandparent, as that term is defined
in the model statute, must exist. Second, if a substantial relation-
ship exists, the judge must consider criteria enumerated in the stat-
ute to determine whether access should be granted. These criteria
attempt to balance the child's interest in the continuity of an impor-
tant relationship with a grandparent and the child's interest in nu-
clear family autonomy. If a substantial relationship with a
grandparent does not exist, judicial inquiry should end unless it is
determined that the grandparent may play a beneficial role in moni-
toring a nuclear family experiencing difficulty in ways potentially
harmful to the child. 12
The model statute attempts to correct the inadequacies of existing
legislation by clearly defining goals and decisionmaking criteria. It
thus limits judicial discretion by preferring legislatively articulated
values over judicially created values. It does not discriminate on the
basis of the type of "family" a child has. Instead, it generally re-
quires that a child have established a substantial relationship with a
grandparent before the best interests of the child are examined.
Defining standards and establishing criteria for decisionmaking
are not easy tasks. The lack of consensus about what is "best" for
children will make any legislative resolution appear arbitrary to
some. Our inadequate knowledge about human behavior and devel-
opment and our inability to predict the future must be recognized as
problems inherent in any decision about a child's welfare. There
are also difficulties in trying to make general guidelines for a large
number of children, each of whom will have different backgrounds,
needs, and unique circumstances. In spite of these difficulties, the
task is well worth attempting in order to increase predictability, de-
crease legal and emotional costs, encourage privately negotiated
agreements, and, most of all, limit judicial discretion. Requiring
judges to articulate their reasoning in detailed findings of fact, as
the model statute recommends, will not only ameliorate some of the
problems listed above, but also will facilitate the dialogue between
the judiciary and the legislature in formulating workable standards.
L ATuclear Family Autonomy and Grandparents' Rights at Common Law
Nuclear family autonomy, that is, the premise that parents gener-
ally have the right to raise their children free from state intrusion,
12. For example, a child residing with an abusive or neglectful parent whose conduct





has long been an important American value.' 3 Proponents of this
view emphasize that parents are granted legal authority over their
children and must make decisions on their behalf according to the
parents' own moral values. State intrusion into family matters must
be minimal, the argument continues, for it is only justified when pa-
rental conduct endangers the child's welfare. Thus, state interven-
tion may be permissible when a parent withholds consent for
necessary medical procedures' 4 or when a parent refuses to send a
child to school.' 5 Even when state intervention may be indicated,
however, family autonomy adherents insist that it be in the least in-
trusive form. 16 Thus, educating abusive or neglectful parents about
better parenting skills or providing supervision for troubled families
are methods of intervention to be preferred over immediately and
permanently removing the child from the home.
As a practical matter, the concept of parental discretion makes
sense. The state does not have the resources or expertise to super-
vise the upbringing of every child within its jurisdiction. 17 Perhaps
more importantly, there is little consensus on the "proper" way to
rear a child. Even in the few areas in which there may be general
consensus-for example, that a child should not be abused-there is
not consensus on specific issues, such as what constitutes "abuse."
The heterogeneity of American society and culture and the result-
,ing lack of consensus about good child-rearing practices indicate
that parents must be given discretion in managing the day-to-day
details of their children's lives. Since parenting is a learned skill,
this discretion would include the right to make non-endangering
13. For the proposition that a realm of family privacy exists that the state cannot
enter, see, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)(Amish children cannot be com-
pelled to attend public schools when they and their parents find it contrary to religious
beliefs); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)(unwed father cannot be denied custody
of his illegitimate children after their mother's death without due process hearing);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)(restriction on teaching foreign languages in
schools violates fourteenth amendment). See also J. Goldstein, A. Freud & A. Solnit,
Before the Best Interests of the Child 3-25 (1979).
14. For example, the state may insist that a child receive certain inoculations before
entering public school, or, in the absence of such inoculations, may insist that the par-
ents renew the physician's certificate every two months. See Mass. Gen. L. ch. 76, § 15
(1982); Commonwealth v. Childs, 299 Mass. 367 (1938). And in certain life-threatening
conditions, the state may allow others to authorize life-saving medical care over parental
objection. See, e.g., In re Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (Mass. 1978).
15. See generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
16. See. e.g., Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State Supervention of
Parental Autonomy, 86 Yale L.J. 645 (1977); Goldstein, Freud & Solnit, supra note 13.
17. Critics of foster care, for example, have pointed out that even when a child is
expressly committed to the state's supervision, disastrous consequences may result. See
Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy,
39 Law & Contemp. Probs. 226 (Summer 1975).
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mistakes in child-rearing. The concept of family autonomy includes
a right to undivided parental authority over children so long as par-
ents are considered fit,' 8 a right to be free from public embarrass-
ment,'" and a right to privacy and intimacy within the nuclear
fainlv. 2-)
Although grandparents may have an interest in establishing and
maintaining relationships with their descendants, this interest tradi-
tionally has been considered less important than children's and par-
ents' interests in nuclear family autonomy. The common law viewed
grandparents' interests as "moral, and not legal" in nature.2 1 Thus,
when children were in the custody of parents, grandparents had no
judicially enforceable right of access to them. Exceptions could
arise in unusual circumstances, such as when the custodial parent
was unfit,22 when the parent had abandoned the child, 23 when the
grandparent had been a primary caretaker, 24 or when a stipulation
expressly accorded the grandparents a right to visitation. 25
Several policy reasons were usually stated for the common law
rule:
(1) A parent's obligation to permit the grandparents contact with
the child was a "moral," not "legal," one, and therefore grandparents
lacked standing to petition the court;
(2) Granting visitation to the grandparents would divide parental
authority, thereby undermining it;
(3) The best interests of children required that children not be
"shattered in the crossfire" between conflicting parents and
grandparents;
(4) When a conflict arose between parents and grandparents, in
the interest of family privacy and autonomy, the parents alone should
make the decision, without having to account for their motives; and
18. See Succession of Reiss, 15 So. 151, 152 (La. 1894) (dicta).
19. 15 So. at 152.
20. 15 So. at 152. See also Zaharoff, Access to Children: Towards a Model Statute for
Third Parties, 15 Faro. L. Q 165, 171 (1981).
21. 15 So. at 152; Smith v. Painter, 408 S.W.2d 785, 786 (Tex. Ct. App. 1966), uit.
ref'd n.r.e., 412 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1967)(per curiam).
22. See 15 So. at 152; Evans v. Lane, 70 S.E. 603 (Ga. Ct. App. 1911). See also discus-
sions in Jackson v. Fitzgerald. 185 A.2d 724 (D.C. 1962); Lee v. Kepler, 197 So.2d 570
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
23. See 15 So. at 152.
24. See 70 S.E. at 603. See also Benner v. Benner, 248 P.2d 425 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1952); Foster & Freed, Grandparent Visitation: Vagaries and Vicissitudes, 23 St. Louis
U.IJ. 643, 646 (1979).
25. See 248 P.2d at 426; Boyles v. Boyles, 302 N.E.2d 199 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973);
Bookstein v. Bookstein, 86 Cal. Rptr. 495 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970). But see People ex rel.




(5) Judicial intervention, being coercive, was not the proper way to
settle intra-family disputes; time and ties of nature were more
effective. 26
Over time, these justifications have given way, as evidenced by the
proliferation of grandparent visitation statutes. Although most stat-
utes provide few clues to the reasons for their enactment, there are
many possible explanations for these legislative developments.
One of the most important is the rising divorce rate, which tripled
between 1960 and 1982.27 In 1982, 25% of children under age 18
in the United States did not live with both natural parents. 28 Non-
custodial parents often find it difficult to ensure their parents access
to grandchildren, especially if the noncustodial parent moves away
after the divorce. Divorce may strain even the best relationships be-
tween custodial parents and their former in-laws, and is almost cer-
tain to exacerbate already tense relations. This tension may lead
custodial parents to deny their children the opportunity to see the
ex-spouse's parents, even where the grandchild-grandparent bond
has been quite strong in the past. This same scenario may occur as a
result of one parent's death.
In either the death or the divorce context, the grandparent access
problem may be compounded by remarriage 2 9 and almost certainly
by the subsequent adoption of a child by a stepparent. Most state
legislatures seem to be responding to these concerns by granting
grandparents standing to petition for grandchild visitation following
the death or divorce of their child. 30 Many have gone further and
provided that adoption by a stepparent does not create an automatic
bar to visitation petitions. 3'
26. Gault, Statutory Grandchild Visitation, 5 St. Mary's L.J. 474, 480-81 (1973).
27. Bureau of Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Current Population Reports, Spe-
cial Studies Series P-20, No. 380, Marital Status and Living Arrangements: Mar. 1982, 4,
Table D (1983).
28. Id. at 5, Table F. Fifty-eight percent of black children did not live with both
natural parents.
29. Eighty-three percent of divorced men and seventy-four percent of divorced wo-
men between ages 45 and 54 remarry. Glick, Remarriage: Some Recent Changes and
Variations, I J. Fain. Issues 455, 466 (1980).
30. At least 45 states permit grandparents to petition for visitation following death
or divorce of the parents, or both. See, e.g., Haw. Rev. Stat. § 571-46 (1976)(divorce or
other custody disputes); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-129(b) (1986)(death only); Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. ch. 119, § 39D (West Supp. 1987)(both); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 72 (Consol.
Supp. 1986)(death or "when circumstances show that conditions exist which equity
would see fit to intervene").
3 1. Statutes in at least 18 states specify that grandparents' rights survive stepparent
adoptions. See. e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 197.5 (West 1982); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 119,
§ 39D (West Supp. 1987). In other states, visitation privileges terminate when a step-
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Another dramatic trend that may have prompted the enactment of
grandparent visitation statutes is the phenomenal increase in illegiti-
mate births to predominantly teenage mothers.3 2 Not only are these
young women often unprepared emotionally and financially for the
burdens of parenting, but evidence suggests that both the mothers
and the children are at increased risk of medical complications. 33
More importantly, young mothers' psychological unpreparedness
may lead to a higher risk of child abuse.3 4 Grandparent access may
provide support for the unprepared mother, as well as protection
for the child against parental ignorance, abuse, or neglect.
In addition, many unwed mothers continue to reside with their
parents after their children are born. Especially in cases where the
mother is trying to finish school or hold down a job, a grandparent
may do much of the day-to-day parenting. Of course, this return to
the grandparental nest also may occur because of divorce, the death
of a spouse, or simply the high cost of housing. With parental du-
ties being shared by grandparents, the child may form a very strong
attachment to a "custodial" grandparent.
Even outside the teenage pregnancy context, the presence of a
monitoring relative may help prevent child abuse. The number of
reported child abuse cases has risen dramatically from 8,000 cases
in 1968 to 850,000 cases in 1981. 3 5 As one commentator points
out, increasing grandparent access to children may be useful in
eliminating such abuse in two ways. First, it may reduce the social
isolation of the parent-child relationship. Such isolation is thought
to be a contributing cause of abuse. Second, mistreated children
may recover better if they have a continuous relationship with an
parent adopts and the grandparent is related through the "replaced" parent. See, e.g..
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-1-116 (1986); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 123.123(4) (1986).
In Illinois, there is a conflict in the case law concerning the effect of stepparent adop-
tion. Contrast In Re Adoption of Schumacher, 458 N.E.2d 94 (Ill. App. 2d 1983) with
Lingwall v. Hoener, 464 N.E.2d 1248 (Il1. App. 4th 1984). In New Mexico, so long as a
child remains with a surviving natural parent, visitation petitions by any grandparent
may be filed. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-9-2 (1986).
32. In 1970, 0.8% of children under the age of 18 lived in never-married single
parent households. By 1982. this figure had risen to 4.4%. Bureau of the Census, supra
note 27, at 5, Table E. Approximately 500,000 children are born annually to teenage
mothers, and 55% of these are born to unmarried adolescents. N.Y. Times. Feb. 10.
1986, at A14, col. 3. The percentage of babies born to unmarried women has risen to
13.4% for whites and 51% for non-whites. Boston Globe, Apr. 19, 1987, at 18, col. 2.
33. N.Y. Times, supra note 32.
34. Arehart-Treichel, America's Teen Pregnancy Epidemic. 113 Sci. News 299 (May
6, 1978).
35. Statistics compiled by the American Humane Society, reported in Washington




adult who can provide "compensatory acceptance, nurturance, and
a positive mode for social experiences." 36
The expansion of grandparent access rights may also be ex-
plained by more subtle sociological changes. In other legal con-
texts, social scientists have pointed to a decline in the use and
effectiveness of traditional means of conflict resolution as a stimulus
for increasing resort to the legal system. 37 Specifically, community
sentiment, peer pressure, religious beliefs, and a feeling of moral
obligation may no longer be enough to convince parents to permit
visitation. If grandparents are denied access to the legal system,
there may be no other forum in which their grievances can be effec-
tively addressed.
The result of all these factors has been that legislators in all 50
states have departed from the common law emphasis on nuclear
family autonomy and enacted grandparent visitation statutes. Obvi-
ously, there is some feeling that relationships with grandparents are
important for children-or vice versa-whether or not social science
can establish conclusively the existence of such benefits.3 8
II. Existing Statutes
If legislators have been concerned with the increase in child abuse
and teenage parenting, and with the special bonds formed between
grandchildren and custodial grandparents, these concerns have not
always been evident in the statutes themselves. Only a handful of
grandparent access statutes specifically deal with the situation in
which a child has resided with grandparents. 39 Only in Texas and
Tennessee do statutes specifically enunciate that grandparents of
children who have been abused or neglected by their parents may
seek visitation. 40 Some statutes address the abuse problem indi-
rectly, however, by permitting grandparents of children in foster
36. Ingulli, Grandparent Visitation Rights: Social Policies and Legal Rights, 87 W.
Va. L. Rev. 295, 306-07 (1985)(citations omitted). But see supra note 8.
37. Rebell,Judicial Activism and the Courts' New Role, Soc. Pol'y 26 (Spring 1982).
38. For an analysis of the social science research findings, see Ingtilli, supra note 36,
at 298-302. 1
39. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 257.022(2a) (West 1982)(grandparents have standing if the
child has resided with the grandparents for 12 months); Tex. Fain. Code Ann.
§ 14.03(e)(6) (Vernon 1986)(grandparents have standing if child has resided with them
for at least six out of the last twenty-four months preceding the petition).
40. Tex. Faro. Code Ann. § 14.03(e)(3) (Vernon 1986): Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-
301(c) (Supp. 1987).
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care to petition for visitation. 4' Yet others actually may compound
the abuse problem by denying standing to grandparents whose chil-
dren have had their parental rights terminated by the state-.4 2
One of the most obvious problems with existing statutes is the
distinctions they draw among classes of grandparents. Some grand-
parents may petition the court for visitation with their grandchil-
dren, while others lack standing. Often, there is also conceptual
confusion regarding the nature of the grandparents' rights. They
may be conditioned on the related parents' rights-the "derivative
rights" theory-on the type of family situation involved, on the
child's best interests, or on a combination of these.
A. Derivative Rights Theory.
Under the derivative rights theory, the grandparents' legal status
depends on the related parent's legal status.43 A right to association
with the child resides primarily with the parents and only seconda-
rily with the grandparents. Thus a grandparent's derivative right
becomes effective only upon legal absence of the related parent.
The most common example of this absence is when a natural parent
dies. The grandparent may then petition for visitation with the
child, since the related parent is no longer able to ensure contact
between grandparent and child.
This conceptualization severely restricts the situations in which
grandparent access may be granted, since under it a court would not
be able to grant such a petition following a divorce. Because non-
custodial parents could take children to see their grandparents,
these grandparents would have no legal right to petition on their
own behalf.
41. Abuse is one reason a child may be temporarily removed from parental care. For
statutes permitting grandparents of children in foster care to petition for access, see
Fenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-301(c) (Supp. 1987); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-1-116(l)(b) (1986).
42. Abuse or neglect is one of the many reasons a court may terminate parental
rights. For statutes denying parents of children whose parental rights have been termi-
nated standing to petition for access to grandchildren, see Nev. Rev. Stat. § 123.123(4)
(1979); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-9-4 (1986). But see Ga. Code Ann. § 19-7-3(b)(3) (1982);
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 14.03(e)(5) (Vernon 1986).
43. See, e.g., state statutes listed supro note 30 that permit grandparent petitions only
where the related parent has died. See also In re Gardner, 287 N.W.2d 555, 558-59 (Iowa
1980); In re the Adoption of a Child by M., 355 A.2d 211, 212-13 (N.J. Ch. 1976). But
see Bennett v. Bennett, 376 A.2d 191 (N.J. Super. 1977), which squarely rejects deriva-
live theory for New Jersey; Mimkon, 332 A.2d at 199; Weichman v. Weichman, 184
N.W.2d 882, 885 (Wis. 1971); and Note, Statutory Visitation Rights of Grandparents:





Another problem stems from the fact that derivative rights are ex-
tinguished when the related parental rights are terminated. When a
stepfather adopts a child, for example, the natural father's legal
rights and obligations end, and the biological paternal grandparents
also lose any visitation privileges they had prior to the adoption.44
Absent express statutory authority, courts have felt themselves con-
strained to deny visitation after adoption. 45 As one court noted, the
case law demonstrates the "tension between the goals of creating a
new family unit for adopted children, on the one hand, and of al-
lowing continuing grandparental contact with grandchildren who
have lost a parent on the other." 4
6
But the nature of adoption has changed over the years. When
abortion was illegal and/or unavailable, and the stigma of illegiti-
mate birth was greater, a higher number of newborn infants were
put up for adoption. Terminating all ties to the natural parents and
extended family made sense and probably was in the child's best
interests, since emotional bonds had not yet formed and the adop-
tive family had a tabula rasa from which to develop ties.
'Currently, however, many of the children being adopted are older
children. Unlike infants, older children may well have developed
relationships with extended family members, especially in cases of
stepparent adoption, and thus may be situated differently than
newborns. But the laws that govern adoption are applied similarly,
regardless of the child's age. This can create hardship, especially
where grandparents have taken care of the child after the death of a
parent or during the child's visits with the noncustodial parent.47
In certain existing legislation, the fact that some grandparent-
grandchild relationships are formed by adoption is not recognized.
This may have undesirable consequences. For example, in Common-
wealth ex. rel. Dogole v. Cherry,48 the question presented was "where a
husband and wife adopt a minor child, the wife dies, and the hus-
band remarries and joins with his second wife in adopting the child,
44. Bit see statutes listed supra note 31 that permit natural grandparents to petition
for access after adoption by stepparent.
45. See, e.g., Aegerter v. Thompson, 610 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Ex parte
Bronstein, 434 So.2d 780 (Ala. 1983); Woodson v. Kilcrease, 648 S.W.2d 72 (Ark. Ct.
App. 1983); In re Nicholas, 457 A.2d 1359 (R.I. 1983); Leake v. Grissom, 614 P.2d
1107 (Okla. 1980); Gardiner, 287 N.W.2d at 555. C.f Bikos v. Nobliski, 276 NW.2d 541
(Mich. Ct. App. 1979)(overruled by Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 710.60(3) (West Supp.
1987), permitting grandparent visitation following stepparent adoption).
46. Gardiner, 287 N.W.2d at 557.
47. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Berman, 118 Cal. Rptr. 804 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975);
Malpass v. Morgan, 192 S.E.2d 794 (Va. 1972).
48. 173 A.2d 650 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1961).
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should visitation rights with the child be granted to the mother of
the deceased first wife, over the objection of the adoptive parents."
The court answered in the negative and explained that Bertha
Dogole, mother of the first wife, was "neither a blood nor an adop-
tive relative of the child," apparently meaning that her legal rela-
tionship to the child had ended with the second adoption. 4 9 This
decision ignored the substantial relationship the grandmother and
grandchild had built through weekly contact during all six years of
the child's life.
Such relationships should not be disregarded after adoption, es-
pecially if the adoptive parent is a stepparent. If a good relationship
between child and grandparent has been established and regular
visitation continues after the custodial parent remarries, 50 it seems
cruel to prohibit such visitation merely because the stepparent le-
gally adopts the child. From the child's point of view, an adoption
decree does not vitiate her affection for her natural grandparents.
Depending on the child's age, the adoption arguably could increase
her desire to be in contact with her natural grandparents in order to
define her identity by knowing her family history. As one court has
noted:
An adopted child may not in all respects be isolated from his or her
natural family. Some may perceive an inconsistency in the termination
of some rights, but not others, between the adoptive child and the nat-
ural family. If such exists, the desire for consistency in the law should
not of itself sever the bonds between the child and the natural
relatives.51
Even if the adoption is in a child's best interests, 52 the disruption
of beneficial relationships created by the lack of continuing contact
may be traumatic for the child. The same may be said even where
the child is adopted by unrelated third parties. The inflexibility of
statutes that take a derivative rights approach makes it impossible
for the courts to do a case-by-case analysis to determine whether
continuing the relationship between the child and her natural family
would facilitate or disrupt adjustment to the adoptive parents.
49. 173 A.2d at 651.
50. The relationship may be established on a voluntary basis or by court order pur-
suant to the grandparent visitation statutes mentioned above.
51. People ex rel. Sibley v. Sheppard, 429 N.E.2d 1049, 1052 (N.Y. 1981).
52. See Note, Visitation After Adoption: In the Best Interests of the Child, 59
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 633, 636 (1984). "[A] court cannot grant . .. [an] adoption petition un-




B. Family Situation Theory
Other statutes focus on the type of family situation, rather than on
derivative rights, in determining which grandparents have standing
to petition for access. For example, some statutes confer standing
-on grandparents only when their child dies, or after divorce of the
parents. Many allow petitions in either situation. 53 One explana-
tion for such statutes is that nuclear family disruption allows the
state to intervene in order to protect the child's best interests.5 4
The derivative rights theory, however, may be looming unarticu-
lated in the death context. These statutes may really be aimed at
protecting the grandparents, or children, from access cut-off by a
vindictive parent. Or the justification may lie in the notion that con-
tinuing beneficial relationships for the child are most important
when a nuclear family disruption has occurred. 55 Unfortunately, the
broad wording of these statutes leave unclear the purposes the leg-
islatures intended them to serve.
. If nuclear family disruption is the key, there are many situations
left uncovered by the majority of statutes. For example, informal or
legal separation by the parents is often overlooked. 56 So is pro-
longed hospitalization, 57 incarceration, 58 temporary or permanent
,incapacity of one or both parents, 59 or even temporary placement of
.the children in foster care. 60 Thus, grandparents of children in
,some situations are treated better or worse than grandparents of
children in other situations, all of whom may have nuclear family
.disruption in common. By failing to articulate the guiding princi-
pies that spurred enactment of visitation statutes, legislatures have
discriminated among different classes of grandparents for no appar-
ent reason. Such discrimination only adds to the confusion sur-
rounding the nature of the grandparents' rights.
.53. See, e.g.. Alaska Stat. § 25.24.150 (1987); Iowa Code Ann. § 598.35 (West 1981);
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:2-7.1 (West 1976).
'54. See, e.g., Zaharoff, supra note 21, at 180-81.
55. See discussion and sources cited in Ingulli, supra note 36, at 311-32, nn. 102-04.
56. Only some statutes mention legal separation. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-1-
116(l)(a) (1986); N.M. Stat. § 40-9-1 (1978); Alaska Stat. § 25.24.150 (1987).
57. No mention of prolonged hospitalization is made in any visitation statute.
:58. Incarceration of a parent specifically gives grandparents standing to petition in
Texas. Tex. Fain. Code Ann. § 14.03(e)(1) (Vernon 1986).
'59. Incapacity or incompetency of a parent specifically gives rise to grandparent
standing in Vermont and Texas. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1012 (1987); Tex. Faro. Code
Ann. § 14.03(e)(1) (Vernon 1986).
60. Grandparents of children in foster care are specifically granted standing in Colo-
rado. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-1-116(b) (1986). See also Iowa Code Ann. § 598.35 (West
1981).
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All such standing distinctions are unnecessary and the model stat-
ute proposed herein would eliminate them. Only one question
needs to be asked in all grandparent visitation cases: Is the child's
relationship with the grandparent so important to the child's devel-
opment that its continuation, and therefore state intrusion into the
nuclear family, is warranted?
C. Best Interests Theory
Perhaps the most important way in which current legislation has
failed to define grandparent visitation rights adequately is by its
consistent conditioning of such rights on the child's best interests. 6'
While in theory this may be the correct approach, the conditional
nature of the right is complicated by the fact that the child's best
interests are never defined by guiding principles and the criteria
that are to be considered in making such a determination are enun-
ciated only rarely.62
Legislative pronouncements on a child's best interests usually
provide no guidance as to what exactly those interests are. Presum-
ably, children share an interest in family privacy and intimacy with
their parents. Children are legally incompetent to make major deci-
sions for themselves, and therefore need autonomous parents to do
so. Thus, both parents and children share an interest in undivided
parental authority.
Family law commentators Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit point to
another interest-the need of every child for unbroken continuity of
an affectionate and stimulating relationship with an adult.63 Presum-
ably, this too is a goal of nuclear family autonomy: to provide an
atmosphere in which such relationships can develop between par-
ents and children free from outside interference.
But while the interests of parents and children may converge in
many ways, there are also situations in which they are not the same.
For example, when a child has formed a substantial, intimate, affec-
tionate, and stimulating relationship with an adult outside the nu-
clear family and a conflict arises between this adult and the parent,
parental interests in family autonomy and a child's interest in main-
taining this outside relationship will necessarily conflict, even in an
61. All 50 statutes have a "best interests of the child" standard or allow visitation "in
the judge's discretion."
62. Only three statutes provide enumerated criteria. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19,
§ 752(5) (Supp. 1987); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 103 (Supp. 1987); Va. Code Ann. § 20-
107.2(1) (Supp. 1987).




-intact" family. It is this conflict that is at the heart of grandparent
visitation statutes.
Existing legislation does not identify this essential conflict be-
tween the interests of parents and children. Especially in the adop-
tion situations discussed above, it is clear that the child may have a
variety of interests not protected by the visitation statutes, perhaps
due to a hesitation on the part of legislators to give children legal
rights independent of those of their parents or due to concern with
the preservation of nuclear family autonomy.
Theoretically, grandparent visitation statutes should address the
conflict that occurs when parents, presumably acting in their child's
best interests, decide not to permit grandparent visitation and
grandparents petition for visitation, presumably representing the
child's interest in maintaining a substantial relationship. The goal
of any grandparent access statute must be to define the conditions
under which a child's interests can outweigh those of her parents.
In practice, however, the best interests of the child standard is too
broad and vague to be of practical use to courts confronted with this
grandparent visitation decision. An analysis of the case law in states
without enumerated criteria reveals that the decisions generally are
based on whatever criteria the judge feels is important. 64 Such an
emphasis raises a problem; the decision as to whether a grandparent
is permitted visitation can be based solely on criteria that are un-
stated at the onset of litigation and not subject to discovery. As a
practical matter, a litigant may never discover the decision-making
criteria. In Massachusetts, for example, probate and family court
judges are not required to file findings of fact and conclusions of law
unless one party files a notice of appeal or makes a motion request-
ing them to do so prior to closing arguments."5
Other statutes provide one or two items for a judge to consider,
but these statutes are far from comprehensive. For example, in Mis-
souri, "[t]he court shall determine if the visitation by the grandpar-
ent would be in the child's best interest or if it would endanger the
child's physical health or impair his emotional development."""6 Vir-
ginia directs the court to look at the "needs" of the child."7
64. See generally Note, Visitation Rights of a Grandparent Over the Objection ofa
Parent: The Best Interests of the Child, 15J. Fam. L. 51 (1976-77). For a sampling of
the variety (or dearth) of criteria relied on, see, for example, .11imkon, 332 A.2d at 201;
Lo Presti v. Lo Presti, 355 N.E.2d 372, 374-75 (N.Y. 1976); Williams v. Miller, 385 A.2d
992, 993-94 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978).
65. Mass. R. Civ. Pro. § 52(a) (1987).
66. Mo. Rev. Stat § 452.400.3 (1986).
67. Va. Code Ann. § 20-107.2(l)(d) (Supp. 1987).
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The effect on the parent-child relationship that visitation by
grandparents might have is an element in several statutes. It gener-
ally is framed in two ways: the possibility that visitation will have a
detrimental effect on the parent-child relationship 68 or the possibil-
ity that the grandparent may be able to facilitate and encourage a
close relationship between parent and child. 69 The child's prefer-
ence is sometimes considered, if the child is thought old enough to
express a freely formed opinion.70 The weight accorded to the
child's preference in case law has ranged from that of an additional
factor justifying the decision to that of a factor not worthy of consid-
eration because it is a product of parental influence.
D. Other Theories
Three statutes seem to support the "substantial relationship"
framework outlined in this Article. North Carolina provides for
grandparent visitation rights following the adoption of the child by a
stepparent or relative where "a substantial relationship exists be-
tween the grandparent and the child." 7' Nebraska's new statute al-
lows a grandparent to seek visitation with a minor grandchild in
certain situations, but the court must find by clear and convincing
evidence that there is or has been "a significant beneficial relation-
ship between the grandparent and child, that it is in the best inter-
ests of the child that such relationship continue, and that such
visitation will not adversely interfere with the parent-child relation-
ship."7 2 The Idaho statute is most explicit: Only those grandpar-
ents who "have established a substantial relationship with a minor
child" may seek visitation.73 Statutes in a number of other states
make the nature of the relationship an element of the best interests
test.7 4 However, no statute defines a "substantial relationship."
68. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 257.022 (West 1982); N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 14-09-05.1
(Supp. 1987). See also Layton v. Foster, 466 N.Y.S. 2d 723 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983), afftd,
61 N.Y.2d 747 (N.Y. 1984).
69. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1013(b)(7) (Supp. 1987); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 12 3.1 2 3 (1)(g) (Supp. 1987).
70. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1013(b)(6) (Supp. 1987); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-59
(1985); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 458:17(VI) (1983). See also Commonwealth ex rel Flan-
nery, 30 A.2d 810 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1943).
71. 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 575.
72. Neb. Legislative Bill 105 (Apr. 10, 1986).
73. Idaho Code § 32-1008 (1983).
74. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1013(b)(3) (Supp. 1987)(the court shall consider "the*
nature of the relationship between the petitioner and the grandchild and the desirability
of maintaining that relationship"); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 123.123(1) (1986)("the court shall
consider the amount of personal contact between the petitioner and the child which




The proposed model statute, by contrast, would define "substan-
i.ial relationship" and only grant grandparent visitation if such a re-
'lationship existed between grandparent and grandchild. In
rconsidering whether such a continuous, affectionate, intimate, and
stimulating relationship existed, the court would consider the
.amount of time the child spent alone with the grandparent, the fre-
quency and regularity of such contact, and the frequency of letters
and phone calls to and from the grandparent.
If the existence of such a relationship were established, the court
then would consider specifically enumerated criteria to determine
whether visitation would be in the child's best interests. Such cri-
teria would include assessment of the child's psychological and
physical needs, the effect on the parent-child relationship, and the
child's expressed preference, among others. And in certain defined,
exceptional circumstances, the court could consider these enumer-
ated criteria and grant visitation even if a substantial relationship
did not exist.
III. Assumptions Used in Formulating a Solution
Under the model statute proposed here, the right to grandparent
access is one that belongs to the child, if certain conditions can be
met. The goal of a grandparent access statute must be to maintain
,the substantial relationships with grandparents that have already
formed. The goal is not to create such relationships, except in ex-
treme circumstances where the grandparent may provide a benefi-
cal monitoring presence when the parent is endangering or unable
to (control the child. However, even where substantial relationships
,or extreme circumstances exist, access should not be granted unless
it \will serve the best interests of the child. In order to improve on
existing grandparent access legislation, the model statute defines
specific criteria to guide a court's determination.
The model statute is predicated on the assumption that one of the
basic needs of every child is for a stable, continuing, affectionate,
,intimate, and stimulating relationship with an adult. Children are
presumed to have such relationships with their custodial parents. A
§ 257.022(1) (West 1982)("The court shall consider the amount of personal contact be-
tween the parents or grandparents of the deceased parent and the child prior to the
application"); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 752(5)(B) (Supp. 1987)(the court shall con-
sider the "relationship of the child with the child's parents and any other persons who
may significantly affect the child's welfare"); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-09-05.1 (Supp.
1987). None of the above statutes gives guidelines for deciding how much contact with
the child is enough to establish a substantial relationship.
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child may or may not have formed other such relationships outside
the nuclear family. 75 In addition, the model statute recognizes the
titc that nuclear family autonomy is an important and necessary
American value. The standard used in measuring whether or not a
grandparent-child relationship should be judicially sanctioned re-
Hects this value by preferring private ordering and only maintaining
those relationships with grandparents that are substantial and nec-
essary to promote the child's healthy growth and development.
Where extreme circumstances indicate that a grandparent may serve
as a beneficial monitoring presence for an unstable family, the goal
would still be to minimize the need for future state intervention by
preferring grandparent involvement rather than state agency super-
vision. Even where the potential for beneficial monitoring exists,
access would be granted only when consideration of enumerated
criteria suggests that it will be helpful rather than detrimental to the
child and the nuclear family.
Consequently, if no substantial relationship exists and the endan-
gering exceptional circumstances are not present, the grandparent's
petition is to be dismissed without further inquiry. If the substantial
relationship exists or the endangering exceptional circumstances
are present, however, the court shall use enumerated criteria to de-
termine whether access is in the child's best interests.
The model statute's focus on the child's relationship with the
grandparents creates a stringent threshold test that many grandpar-
ents will not be able to pass. Consequently, the barriers to suit for
certain categories of grandparents that appear in many existing stat-
utes are unnecessary. For example, when a child is in an intact nu-
clear family or has been adopted by a stepparent, some existing
statutes deny standing to the grandparent. From the child's point of
view, if all of the criteria under the proposed statute indicate that
visitation is in the child's best interests, the legal distinctions be-
tween these situations and others where standing is not an issue
seem irrelevant. Thus, the proposed statute eliminates such unnec-
essary legal line-drawing.
75. For purposes of this Article, I have limited my discussion to grandparents,
although this is an artificial barrier. Some statutes permit great-grandparents, other rel-
atives, or other third parties to petition for access, and although I do not address these
situations, the guidelines proposed here may be applicable. See. e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 25-337.01(B) (Supp. 1987)(great-grandparents); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-1-116
(1986)(grandparents). For the third-party approach, see Cal. Civ. Code § 4601 (West
1983); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-59 (1985).
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If it is determined, under the proposed statute, that a substantial
relationship exists and that visitation should be granted, the judge
then must determine how much contact the child is entitled to. In
this regard, the court must consider the other outstanding judicial
visitation orders that affect the child and the activities and schedules
of the parties. Some existing statutes expressly provide the court
with the option to appoint a guardian ad litem or an attorney for the
child. 76 Others permit the court to refer the matter to a family rela-
tions department for investigation and/or evaluation. 77 The model
statute allows the court to consult with other professionals to the
extent it considers such consultation necessary.
Under the model statute, the initial burden of proof will be placed
on the petitioning grandparent to establish that a substantial rela-
tionship or exceptional circumstances exist and that consideration
of the enumerated criteria warrant visitation. This provision reflects
a presumption, stemming from the nuclear family autonomy theory,
that the parent is making the proper choice in denying access to the
grandparent. Once a visitation order is granted, it may be modified
only on a showing of a change of circumstances. This requirement
is intended to preserve the status quo after an order is implemented
in the hope that the parties will adjust to it. It is also designed to
discourage the disgruntled parent or grandparent from petitioninjg
for modification two weeks after an order is implemented. Along
the same line, the model statute contains a clause that limits the pe-
titioner's ability to refile if the first petition is denied. Several stat-
utes impose these kinds of limits. 7 8 The justification is again to buy
time for the parties to adjust. This provision may help dissolve some
tension and encourage more informal negotiation.
Under the model statute, courts will be required to submit find-
ings of fact in support of their determinations regarding the pres-
ence or absence of a substantial relationship, of exceptional
76. Alaska Stat. § 25.24.310(a), (c) (1987)(attornev or guardian ad litem); Mont.
Code Ann. § 40-9-102(4) (1985)(attornev).
77. rex. Faro. Code Ann. § 14.03(g) (Vernon 1986)(where there has been a history
of conflict, court may order counseling to facilitate compliance with court order); Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 767.245(7) (West 1981)(wheie visitation rights are interfered with, the fain-
ily court commissioner shall refer the matter for investigation by the department of fam-
ily conciliation).
78. See, e.g.., Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1015 (Supp. 1987)(once a year absent a real,
substantial. and unanticipated change of circumstances); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-9-3(A)
(1986)(once a year absent a showing of good cause); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-1-116(3)
(1986)(once every two years absent a showing of good cause); Mont. Code Ann. § 40-9-
102(3) (1985)(once every two years unless there has been a significant change in
circumstances).
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circumstances, and of the enumerated criteria.5 Such explication is
important if the parties are to understand the reasoning of the court
and to take its order seriously; it may also help judges to recognize
their own biases. Additionally, these findings of fact will facilitate
dialogue between the judiciary and the legislature, which will help
iron out ambiguities in the statute's meaning or purpose.
The standards for appellate review of decisions made under the
model statute are those commonly used in civil cases-a judge's
findings of fact will not be overturned unless clearly wrong or unless
the judge abused his or her discretion. This standard reflects the
presumption that a trial court is in the best position to assess credi-
bility of witnesses and family dynamics.80
IV. Model Grandparent Access Statute and Commentary
The first major shortcoming in existing legislation is the failure to
identify the purposes that grandparent visitation is thought to serve.
Most statutes do not explain whether they intend to provide chil-
dren with access to grandparents or grandparents with access to
grandchildren. These laws also lack any discussion of who, if any-
one, has "rights," and how these rights should be factored into visi-
tation decisions.
Second, as discussed above, it appears that little consideration has
been given to deciding which situations merit overriding nuclear
family autonomy for the sake of the child's needs. For example, in
many states, grandparents have standing to petition only when the
nuclear family has been disrupted by death or divorce.8' However,
one can imagine many other situations in which intervention may be
warranted to protect the physical and emotional well-being of the
child: physical or mental illness of a parent resulting in prolonged
hospitalization, parental abuse or neglect, parental abandonment,
or placement of the child in foster care. As a result, the existing
79. See, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1211.2 (Supp. 1985)(required only upon denial of
visitation); Il. Ann. Star. ch. 110 1/2, para. 11-7.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987)(required
only upon denial of visitation); Ind. Code Ann. § 31-1-11.7-7 (Burns 1987)(required
only upon denial of visitation).
80. Vermont, for example. does not allow the grandparents to appeal any decision
concerning visitation. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1011 (c) (Supp. 1987).
81. At least 45 states permit grandparents to petition for visitation following death
or divorce of the parents, or both. See, e.g., Haw. Rev. Stat. § 571-46 (1976)(divorce or
other custody disputes); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-129(b) (1986)'death only); Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. ch. 119, § 39D (West Supp. 1987)(both). It should be noted that some states
do not appear to limit the situations in which grandparents ma petition. See, e.g., N.Y.
Dom. Rel. Law § 72 (Consol. Supp. 1986); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 950(7) (Supp.




framework of most statutes leads to unnecessary discrimination be-
tween different categories of grandparents, and raises questions
about the circumstances under which the state should provide a fo-
rum for intra-family dispute resolution. But the most important
problem with these statutes is that the majority provide no criteria
for the judge to consider in the visitation determination-visitation
may be granted simply when it will be in the child's best interests.
The consequences of this vague best interests standard are that
judges often will have to impose their own moral values and opin-
ions about child-rearing in the absence of legislative principles.
This broad discretion allows for an unarticulated, private agenda to
govern a dispute in which the court has no personal interest and is
largely incapable of supervising on a day-to-day basis. Allowing a
judge to impose personal values arguably is worse than directing
him or her to impose values that a legislature has chosen, because a
judge is less personally accountable to the public than is the repre-
sentative legislature. In the grandparent visitation context, for ex-
ample, the fact that most judges are old enough to have
grandchildren themselves may have a tremendous influence on the
outcome of any given lawsuit.
In addition, because different courts may weigh competing factors
differently, similar cases are not treated alike under the best inter-
ests standard. This fact tends to increase litigation. Since it is im-
possible to predict what a court will decide, there are no legal
incentives to negotiate and settle before trial. A trial on the merits
can be quite expensive, in both financial and emotional costs, and
may be a less than optimal use of scarce judicial resources.
This statute is designed to implement the principle that access to
grandparents is a limited right of the child. It is limited because
family autonomy concerns create a presumption that the parent as
legal guardian of the child is acting in the child's best interests.
When a grandparent brings suit, he or she is trying to rebut that
presumption, and serves as the nominal petitioner for vindication of
the child's limited right.
Preamble:
The public policy guidelines of the statute are severalfold:
1. All children are entitled to enjoy secure, stable, and beneficial
relationships with their parents. It is the goal of this statute to main-
tain these relationships unless they endanger the welfare of the child
as defined in the child abuse and neglect laws of this State.
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2. If a child has formed a "substantial relationship" with a
grandparent, as defined in this statute, and judicial consideration of
the enumerated criteria in this statute indicates that maintaining
that relationship is in the child's best interests, an access order may
be imposed by the court.
3. If no substantial relationship with a grandparent has been
formed, the case must be dismissed with prejudice and no judicial
consideration of the enumerated criteria is permitted.
4. Even if a substantial relationship with the grandparent has
been formed, if judicial consideration of the enumerated criteria
reveals that access would not be in the child's best interests, any
request for contact will be denied.
5. In exceptional circumstances, a court may consider grandpar-
ent access even where a substantial relationship with the grandpar-
ent does not already exist. These exceptional circumstances arise
where parental conduct endangers the child or where parents are
unable to control the child. If, after consideration of the enumer-
ated criteria, the court finds that the grandparent may serve as a
beneficial monitoring presence for the child, an access order may be
imposed.
6. Because the purpose of visitation is to benefit the child by,
maintaining a continuous substantial relationship, any benefit to the
grandparent is secondary. Because of this focus on the child's bene-
fit, there is no reason to impose artificial limits on which grandpar-
ents have standing to petition. Therefore, a grandparent may
petition even where a child resides with two natural parents or
where a child has been adopted by a stepparent or other third party.
Moreover, where the grandparent-grandchild bond is formed by
adoption in the first instance, the adoptive grandparent may petition
even where the child is subsequently adopted by a stepparent. It is
this State's policy that standing to vindicate a child's limited right to
grandparent access shall not be limited to "bloodline" grandpar-
ents. Standing shall not be granted on a "derivative rights" theory,
wherein a grandparent's standing is conditioned on the legal ab-
sence of the related parent of the child through death or other
circumstances.
7. These policy guidelines are intended to emphasize that
grandparent access orders are intrusive to the nuclear family and
should only be granted in unusual circumstances. Court orders
should maintain only those grandparent-grandchild relationships




rental prerogatives and warrant state intrusion. Procedural restric-
tions are intended to limit litigation.
I. Purposes:
(a) The goals of this statute are to maintain only those relation-
ships between grandchildren and grandparents that are substantial
and to allow access only when it is found to be in the child's best
interests after consideration of the enumerated criteria in Section
111(b) of this statute.
(b) In the absence of a substantial relationship between the
grandchild and the grandparent, it is the goal of this statute to pro-
vide a beneficial monitoring presence for the child in certain excep-
tional circumstances outlined in Section III(d).
II. Definitions:
(a) A "substantial relationship" between a grandparent and a
grandchild is one that is continuous, affectionate, intimate, and
stimulating to the child. In determining whether a substantial rela-
tionship has formed, the following factors must be considered:
(1) the amount of time spent alone with the grandparent;
(2) the frequency of contact with the grandparent;
(3) the regularity of contact with the grandparent over
the course of the child's life;
(4) the frequency of letters and phone calls to and from
the grandparent.
(b) The following are examples of situations that may give rise
to the formation of a substantial relationship between child and
grandparent. The examples are illustrative and are not meant to be
exclusive.
(1) The child has resided with the grandparent and the
grandparent has had de facto custody of the child due to a
nuclear family disruption such as parental death, divorce,
illness, hospitalization, institutionalization, incarceration,
abandonment, or informal or legal separation;
(2) The child has resided with parent(s) and the grand-
parent in the same household;
(3) The grandparent has been a part-time primary care-
taker of the child on a regular basis-e.g., has been the
child's babysitter while the parents worked or were other-
wise unavailable to care for the child;
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(4) The grandparent has provided custodial care for the
child for extended periods of time when there were no nu-
clear family disturbances, such as when the parents were on
vacation, during school vacations or holidays, or when the
child was home from school due to illness.82
(c) A "grandparent" is the biological or adoptive parent of the
child's biological parent or the child's adoptive parent.
(d) A "parent" is the child's biological father or mother or adop-
tive father or mother.
(e) A "nuclear family disruption" is characterized by a tempo-
rary or permanent loss or estrangement of one nuclear family mem-
ber, whether the nature of the family is biological, adoptive, or
common law. The following are examples of nuclear family
disruptions:
(1) informal or legal separation of the parents, whether
married or not;
(2) divorce of the parents;
(3) prolonged illness or hospitalization of a nuclear fam-
ily member whether for physical or mental health reasons;
(4) institutionalization of a nuclear family member;
(5) incarceration of a parent or other nuclear family
member;
(6) state intrusion into the nuclear family caused by an
adjudication of abandonment, abuse, or neglect by one nu-
clear family member toward another;
(7) temporary or permanent legal incapacity or incompe-
tence of a parent caused by a physical or mental disability;
(8) the placement of a child in foster care;
(9) state intrusion into the nuclear family caused by an
adjudication of the child as "a child in need of supervision"
or "delinquent;"
(10) termination of parental rights.
82. While these examples are not meant to be exhaustive, they are meant to illus-
trate the high threshold that must be met before a grandparent's relationship with a
child will be considered substantial enough to warrant court-ordered visitation. For ex-
ample, a grandparent who has spent no time alone with the child and/or has visited for
one-day periods two or three times a year would not, without more, be considered to
have formed the necessary bond with the child. In some ways, this requirement may be
punitive for the grandparent who has had a rather "normal" experience, meaning that
no primary care for the child has taken place or that past visitation has been infrequent
and of short duration. The restriction is intentional. In order to justify an intrusion into
nuclear family autonomy, there must be a strong attachment without which the child




(f) A "change of nuclear family membership" occurs when the
parent remarries, or when the parent enters into an intimate rela-
tionship with another adult and cohabits with that individual.
III. Substantive Provisions:
(a) In all actions concerning petitions for grandparent access, a
hearing will be held to determine whether a substantial relationship,
as defined in this statute, exists between the grandparent and the
child.
(b) If a substantial relationship is found to exist, or if the nuclear
family situation is one that fits under the exceptional circumstances
enumerated in Section 111(d), the court will consider each of the fol-
lowing criteria to determine whether access to the grandparent is in
the best interests of the child:
(1) whether access will promote or hinder the child's psy-
chological or physical development;
(2) whether access will facilitate or disrupt the child's
healthy psychological attachments to his or her nuclear
family, particularly following a nuclear family disruption or
change in membership;
(3) whether access will divide the child's loyalties and
have a detrimental effect on the parent-child relationship;
(4) whether the grandparent is willing and able to en-
courage and facilitate a close and continuing relationship
between the child and the other parties;
(5) whether the child is in favor of or against access, if the
child is capable of freely forming and expressing an opin-
ion in the matter;
(6) the potential benefits and detriments to the child in
granting the visitation order;
(7) the physical and emotional health of the adults
involved;
(8) the capacity of the adults involved for future compro-
mise and cooperation in matters involving the child's phys-
ical and emotional health and development;
(9) the reasons given by respondents for opposing access,
for example, that the petitioners have constantly interfered
in the parent-child relationship and criticized parental be-
havior or decisions that do not endanger the child and are
decisions that parents alone should make, such as the
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choice of a child's wardrobe, education, or religious train-
ing; and
(10) any other factor that the court considers relevant to a
fair and just determination regarding access.
(c) If the court finds that no substantial relationship exists and
that the nuclear family situation is not one that fits under the excep-
tional circumstances enumerated in Section 111(d), the court shall
dismiss the petition without considering the best interests criteria
outlined in Section 111(b).
(d) In the absence of a significant relationship with the grand-
parent, the court may consider granting grandparent access in the
following exceptional circumstances:
(1) The parent or the spouse or cohabitor of the parent
has abused or neglected the child in such a way that endan-
gers the child's well-being, and grandparent access will
serve as a beneficial monitoring presence in conjunction
with or in lieu of state supervision. If the grandparent has
engaged in abusive or neglectful behavior toward either
the child or the parent when he or she was a child, this
section shall not apply;
(2) The child has been adjudicated "a child in need of su-
pervision" or "delinquent" and grandparent access will
serve as a beneficial monitoring presence in conjunction
with state supervision; or
(3) The parent is an alcoholic or addicted to illegal sub-
stances and grandparent access will serve as a beneficial
monitoring presence.
If any of the above circumstances apply, the court will consider the
enumerated criteria in Section III(b) to determine whether grand-
parent access will be in the child's best interests.
(e) Adoption of the child by a stepparent, relative, or other third
party is not an automatic bar to grandparent access if:
(1) a substantial relationship exists between the grand-
parent and the child, and
(2) upon consideration of the enumerated criteria in Sec-
tion III(b), continued access is in the child's best interests.
(f) In formulating access orders, the court shall strive to make
the access order fit into the child's and parents' schedule with the
least amount of inconvenience or disruption, for example by sched-
uling access for times in which the child would normally be in the




ing factors in determining the type, frequency, and duration of
grandparent access:
(1) the frequency and duration of contact with other per-
sons mandated by outstanding judicial orders;
(2) the child's extracurricular activities and schedule;
(3) the parents' activities and schedules; and
(4) reasonable limitations on gifts for the child or tele-
phone calls and letters, or the allowance of telephone calls
and letters in favor of a less-frequent visitation schedule.
IV? Procedural Items:
(a) Standing. Any grandparent, as defined in Section 11(c) of
this statute, shall have standing to petition on behalf of a minor
child for access.
(b) Findings of fact. In every matter in which grandparent ac-
cess is granted or denied, the court shall make detailed findings of
fact on the determination regarding the presence or absence of a
substantial relationship, of exceptional circumstances, and of the
enumerated criteria listed in Section 111(b).
(c) Representation of the child. The court, acting sua sponte or
on the motion of either or both parties, may appoint a guardian ad
litem or counsel for the child if such an appointment will facilitate
resolution of the matter or aid in the fact-finding process.
(d) Burden of proof. The petitioner must prove that access is in
the child's best interests by a preponderance of the evidence.
(e) Expert testimony. The court may hear expert testimony
from one or both parties in regard to any matter relevant to the
access determination. If one or both parties cannot afford the ex-
pense of obtaining expert testimony, the court may appoint an in-
dependent expert. The court may also refer the matter to the family
relations division for examination and recommendation.
(f) Modification. The court may modify an existing access order
on a showing of change of circumstances. In a hearing on a com-
plaint for modification, the burden of proof will be on the moving
party to show that a change of circumstances warrants a change in
the access order.
(g) Limits on refiling. If a petition for access is denied because
no substantial relationship exists, no exceptional circumstances ex-
ist, or because access will not be in the child's best interests after
consideration of the enumerated criteria in Section III(b), the peti-
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tioners may not file another petition for 18 months absent a real,
substantial, and unanticipated change of circumstances.
(h) Expiration of order. The court may, in its discretion, either
fix an expiration date on the access order or make it an ongoing
order. In either case, it may be modified in accordance with Section
IV(f).
(i) Appeal. If an appeal is taken from an access order or denial,
the appellate court may reverse the trial court's decision only if it is
shown that the trial court committed clear error or abused its
discretion.
(j) Enforcement. Whenever access rights are granted, the court
may issue such orders as shall be necessary to enforce such rights.
The court may not issue any order restricting the movement of the
child out of the court's jurisdiction if such restriction is solely for the
purpose of allowing the grandparent the opportunity to exercise ac-
cess rights.8 3 A court may require any party to post a bond to insure
compliance with the access order.8 4
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